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Discordant Order: Manila’s Neo Patrimonial Urbanism  
 
 
Peter Murphy and Trevor Hogan 
 
Manila is one of the world’s most fragmented, privatized and un-public of cities. Why is this so? 
This paper contemplates the seemingly immutable privacy of the city of Manila, and the 
paradoxical character of its publicity. Manila is our prime exemplar of the twenty-first century 
mega-city whose apparent disorder discloses a coherent order which we here call ‘neo-
patrimonial urbanism’. Manila is a city where poor and rich alike have their own government, 
infrastructure, and armies, the shopping malls are the simulacra of public congregations once 
found in cathedrals and plazas, and where household order is matched by streetside chaos, and   
personal cleanliness wars with public dirt. We nominate the key characteristics of  this uncanny 
approximation of  chaotic and discordant order – a polyphonous and polyrhythmic  social order 
but one lacking  harmony – and offer a historical sociology, a genealogy that traces an 
emblematic pattern across the colonizing periods of its emergent urban forms into the 
contemporary impositions of gated zones and territories. The enduring legacy of patrimonial 
power to Manila is to be found in the households and on the streets that undermine and devalue 
public forms of social power in favour of the patriarch and his householders ( now relabeled as 
‘shareholders‘  in ‘public companies’)  at the cost of harmonious, peaceable and just public 
order. Such a state of affairs is not only destructive  of  the historic built environment of the city, 
especially its public parks and plazas and heritage districts, its streets, footpaths, public 
transport and utilities,  but is directly injurious of its citizens. To address the question of 
Manila’s private order and public chaos is to reopen the quest for the good city as the just polis. 
It is also to takes us beyond arguments of indigenous versus colonial forms of urbanism that are 
mired in nationalist and modernization ideologies respectively, and it is  to reject  the reductive 
logics of globalization arguments that Asian mega-cities are but variations of American logics 
of urbanism. 
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 Public Chaos and Private Order 
Streets are a fractal of the larger patterns of urban society. The kinds of order they 
embody replicate the kinds of order to be found at higher and lower levels of a social system. To 
take a simple example: a back street that runs parallel with Katipunan Road in Quezon City. 
Quezon City is one of a multitude of urban centers that make up the Los Angeles-like 
morphology of Metro Manila.
1
 The street in question has no unusual character. Like numerous 
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thoroughfares adjacent to a major road artery, the older residential property in the street is 
gradually giving away to multi-storied apartments and medium-rise retail and commercial 
property. In any typical street it is the small things that stand out. In this Quezon City street, it is 
the quality of tiling at the entrance of one of these new medium-rise buildings. It catches the eye 
because it has a finish that is often lacking in Manila buildings. This is a city where the ready 
availability of very cheap labor means that employers and developers habitually use untutored 
backs in place of skilled hands. To the passer-by, the building entrance looks immaculate. Yet, 
what is equally evident is the public frame of this polished craftwork. The building entrance 
abuts a commonplace Manila footpath—a crumbling wreck of a pathway. In the micro-world of 
the street, in one quick step, the passer-by moves from the smooth space of the regular tiled 
portico to a striated space filled with enough irregular-shaped rises and falls to make a 
contemporary mathematical topologist gleeful in perpetuity.     
While the mathematician may find undulating topologies fascinating, the walker finds 
them annoying. The typical footpath in Manila, if it exists at all, is difficult and frustrating to 
negotiate. It is almost always an instance of obstructive distortion. The state of the footpaths is 
representative of the travails of public space in the Philippine city. To cross the threshold into a 
private building is often exhilarating for someone on foot, because it means escaping the dented 
topology of walking space into space organized around more classical, and more emotionally 
satisfying, geometries.  
Classical geometries of space—be they Euclidean, Gothic, Cartesian, or post-
Euclidean—are the invisible sub-structure of a visible order. Euclidean solid geometry, Neo-
platonic Gothic geometry, Descartes’ coordinate geometry, and cubist-type n-dimensional 
geometry are key building blocks that define a city’s pattern rationality. This applies at every 
level—from the microcosm of the tile to the macrocosm of the city plan. The reason for the 
success of autopoietic city building based on geometric form is that human beings find such 
patterns deeply satisfying. Patterns are a bridge between emotion and reason. The qualities that 
patterns represent are encapsulated in the idea of beauty. These qualities—such as grace, 
elegance, and economy—are both descriptions of reason and objects of feelings. How a city, 
from path to street to block, and beyond, is designed is a work of collective affective rationality. 
Through the template of patterns, the collective force of a city over generations engages in an 
act of collective design. The successes and failures of the demiurgic project are dependent on 
many factors—most of them lying beyond conscious manipulation or legislation. The greatest 
test of demiurgic success is the quality of public space. Public space that “works” is a pure 
expression of collective reason. Such space is accessible to, enjoyed by, amenable to, and 
representative of everyone in the society. It is deeply satisfying space. 
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Public space is a force that shapes the collective demiurge. The demiurge in turn gives 
shape to public space. This circularity often breaks down in practice. When that break occurs, 
the result is what we see in cities like Manila. There are good, attractive, interesting spaces in 
the city—but, for the most part, they are not public spaces. Good space in Manila is mostly 
private space, like the portico of the building described before. It is the space of private houses 
and apartments, university campuses, and gated communities. Some of these spaces are 
attractive—certainly many are pleasant. Yet they mostly appear as places of relief from the 
cracked topology of public space and the stresses of negotiating it. Gates and walls almost 
universally protect these private spaces. Where people can afford it, ubiquitous armed guards 
patrol the threshold between public and private. The Philippines is possibly the first society in 
the world to have universalized the gated community. The most visible emblems of this are the 
walled communities of the wealthy. But, unlike California where it is only the wealthy who 
want to retreat behind gates into sanitized invisibility, everyone except the utterly dispossessed 
in the Philippines erects gates and fences and walls around their property and around 
themselves. Even the most modest dwellings are gated with ceiling-high wrought-iron fences. 
Rich and poor alike have their own security guards and private armies.  
Filipinos have even learnt to burrow into pocket space while on the move. Anyone who 
can afford it drives an automobile to avoid having to walk around the streets. The private car is 
probably more prized than even the private residence. Immaculately maintained and mostly 
new, Filipino cars on the road act like mobile bubbles of sanctuary from unpalatable public 
space. In the car, drivers and passengers escape the discordance of the streets behind the almost 
hermetic seal of the bubble. The search takes at least two forms by car and by phone. In both 
forms these are private solutions to public problems and indeed driven by the absence of the 
public altogether.  
Moreover, the search for the hermetic seal is driven by real practical considerations. 
The dispossessed of Philippine society cause constant anxieties for the possessed. Interestingly, 
this is not only the fear that the propertyless might steal property. Ownership is defined as much 
by use as by legal fiat. Any property that is not developed can be squatted upon and once a 
squatter has established him or herself, the nominal owner, should he or she wish to develop the 
land, is obliged to pay the squatters to move on. Anxieties are also created because the 
dispossessed—with nowhere else to go—occupy streets and parks for the purpose of shelter and 
business. Street hawkers colonize footpaths and roads to sell their wares; unused bits of public 
land are taken over by shanty dwellers. Through this process, what is nominally labeled as 
‘public space’ is privatized by a kind of subaltern colonization with a concomitant array of 
complex rents to be paid by each of the stakeholders who are constantly redefining these liminal 
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spaces. Examples abound but two can suffice here. The street vendor pays rent to the shopowner 
whose frontage they occupy (even though nominally the footpath is state property). The 
squatting vendor also pays ‘fines’ to the parking inspectors and the local policemen. Should the 
vendor successfully entrench their business they can sell it to others – usually new incoming 
families from the provinces. A second example is that of the parkers at busy intersections in 
peak hour traffic who receive commissions from jeepney and FX taxis on the side streets 
wishing to enter the main avenues to pay ‘fees’ to the traffic policemen to change the traffic 
directions.  The cumulative effect of these informal, labyrinthine and highly imaginative private 
solutions and strategems is to surround public space with an aura that is uncanny, an aura that is 
present in its absence. What makes it uncanny is the inability of anyone to decide whether the 
space they are in is really public or private. The uncanny leaves people on a knife-edge, 
psychologically speaking. Living in a world permeated with uncanny meanings induces a sense 
of unaccountable fear and loathing—unaccountable because it has no clear source. It is fear and 
loathing induced by an irresolvable ambiguity that occurs when public and private meanings 
merge, or take on the characteristics of each other. 
In Philippine life, the most private of space—the household—is filled with other 
people: friends, relations, and servants. Private never means privacy. Indigenous and medieval 
Spanish notions of the crowded house dominate. The always-filled private realm has a pseudo-
public character. The family is the commons. Public life, in a mirror image of this, has a 
pseudo-private character. The most successful contemporary public spaces in the Philippines are 
the malls. Here, again, public and private merge. The malls are like cars—glass-and-metal 
bubbles. Like the car they are private spaces; but like the street they are also public, or at least 
simulacra of the public. The malls have their gates and the ubiquitous guards that regulate entry 
into the insulated bubble space. All social classes flock to them. They have replaced many of the 
traditional locales for promenading, socializing, even for religious services. In a tropical 
climate, the air-conditioning of these bubble spaces has become almost a public good. We 
should not overstate the uniqueness of this. Markets have long been key public spaces. One of 
the important functions of the European medieval church was to act as a protector for markets 
set up near by. Nonetheless the contemporary mall is an oddly private public. It is a very 
popular congregational space. Yet it is privately policed. Moreover it is a public space where the 
public theatre of government and opposition is absent.  
Greek, Roman, medieval civic, Renaissance, and European colonial markets were 
always interweaved with municipal, legal, religious, educational and scientific public spheres. 
The mall in contrast is the plaza privatized. In the mall-dominated city, what disappears is a 
visible center where markets are collocated with assemblies. Movie-going and charismatic 
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religious assembly are among the few congregational activities to be found in the malls. The 
flipside of this is that formal and informal assembly space in Manila is scarce. This helps 
explain the fact that, in last decades of the twentieth century, it was the streets—in particular, 
the great EDSA Avenue
2—that were the principal gathering place for opposition to government 
misrule. Streets function perfectly well as civic places on the occasion of massive outpourings 
of public feeling. In such cathartic moments, pedestrians momentarily reclaim the streets from 
the automobile. However, such “assemblies of the whole”, the dream of direct democracy, are 
normally rare events. What is interesting about the Philippines is that it experienced a 
succession of “assemblies of the whole” at peak moments through the 1980s and 1990s—
something quite exceptional in world-historical terms. Yet the country was not able to replicate 
this public wellspring in either the workings of its legislative assemblies and executive councils 
or in its artistic and scientific publics.  
The fundamental reason for this is that public and private spheres in Manila have been 
reversed. So that while the private mall has become the public space par excellence, ordinary 
governance and politics, which is systemically corrupt, is for all intents and purposes a vast 
private bailiwick. So much so that, in the minds of the idealistic fraction of the professional 
middle class, non-government organizations have come to be the exemplars of public service. 
This fuzzy in-distinction between public and private permeates all Filipino institutions. The 
public arts are almost entirely in the hands of private collectors. Charismatic religion, with its 
emphasis on the pietism, has made considerable in-roads into the terrain of traditional 
Catholicism. Pietism is private religion. It substitutes the affections of the heart for the public 
grace of beauty. The sentimentalization of the public sphere is captured perfectly in maxims 
such as the popular one that describes Manila as “the city of our affections”. The classroom is 
socially esteemed but its imperatives of grades, qualifications, and teaching also colonize the 
public sphere of science.
3
 Japanese-style private tutoring constitutes a shadow industry that 
underscores and amplifies this. Journalists incessantly speak in the first person, and often in a 
pseudo-pietistic style. At the same time, the great congregational public theatres for arts 
performances and science conferences are under-valued and under-resourced. The ethos of a 
privatized society is reflected even in the virtual world. Private text messaging on mobile 
phones is pervasive in the Philippines. All social classes use it. Meanwhile the public web space 
of Internet pages languishes for want of interest and upkeep.
4
    
In a more general sense, public work is privatized. This is nowhere clearer than on the 
bottom rungs of Philippine society, where hard labor for little reward is the norm. Labor is 
privatized work. It is subject to few public standards—conspicuously missing are enforceable 
trade, consumer, and professional standards. Labor is survival work. A laboring society 
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produces little in the way of effective trade unions or skill-based association. It likewise 
produces little in the way of congregational work: the performative, theatrical, or public work of 
those who advance the arts and sciences. In such societies, labor is intuitively preferred to any 
schemes that might rationalize labor.
5
 The gangs that cut sugar cane or rake leaves for a body 
and soul-destroying pittance might be eliminated with machines. But even those who criticize 
the pitiable condition of the laboring poor do not want to eliminate labor. They object to the 
cheapness of labor or the unemployment of labor, but not to the act of labor itself—even if on 
balance the making, distributing, marketing, and selling of machines creates many more and 
better jobs than labor rationalization destroys. At the end of the day, a laboring society simply 
prefers labor. To do otherwise would be to turn laborers into public workers and public actors 
whose votes and loyalties cannot be purchased and who are not quietistic or pietistic.  
But, if this were to happen, who would be the gatekeepers who keep guard on the 
threshold between the fractured nature of the streets and the sentimental sanctum of the private 
world? Only a laboring society can afford the all-pervasive gatekeepers in their starched 
uniforms representing the social authority that pretends to parse private from public in a society 
where nobody is really sure anymore where the boundaries are. Gatekeeping in this society is 
one of the commonest forms of labor—and one that is valued because it is not back breaking. It 
is one step removed from the street and the field. It gives some dignity. But it is also a via media 
of great illusions.  
 
The Spanish Period: Inside and Outside the Gate 
Where did the imaginary of the gated society come from? In the Philippines’ case there 
are a number of overlapping precedents for it. The Chinese cultural preference for the chaotic 
street and the hidden order of garden and home is one important precedent.
6
 The Chinese have 
long been an influential minority in the Philippines.
7
 The Spanish—who were the principal 
colonizers – inventors in deed and naming of ‘the Philippines’8—also brought with them their 
own notions of hidden order and public discord. If the mix of street chaos and the hidden order 
of the garden was an orthodox ethos for the Chinese, in the Spanish case the mix of discordance 
and order was a heterodox influence, perhaps even a mildly heretical one. It echoed the very 
subtle heterodox Islamic influences on Spanish Catholicism. (We should not forget that the 
Spanish Inquisition was directed against the large numbers of Islamic and Jewish converts to 
Catholicism.) Islam was a major influence on Spanish urban culture. In Islamic conceptions of 
urban order, order is hidden in private pocket-like or slot-like spaces of internal courtyard 
gardens and in the inner sanctums of private dwellings. Sanctity in this sense is private not 
public. 
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Officially the Spanish view of order was “Augustinian”. The public edifices of church-
and-plaza were keystones of Spanish colonialism throughout their empire.
9
 In the official 
Spanish view, church-and-plaza was a kind of designed order based on Augustine’s distinction 
between the chaos of the City of Man and the lucidity of the City of God represented by the 
church. Spanish religious orders Christianized the Philippine archipelago. They also urbanized 
the archipelago. Christianity and urbanity were twins. This was a function of the explicitly 
material sub-stratum of Greek-Latin-Christian civilizing processes.
10
 Symptomatic of this 
civilizing pattern, there were seventeen church-and-plaza complexes alone in the Old Manila of 
the Spanish Era. In actual practice, though, the symbolic center of Spanish rule in the 
Philippines was not a great plaza, but the Intramuros—the historic walled city of Manila, where 
the public sphere was sealed off in a stone container.  
Governor-General Miguel Lopez de Legaspi began work on this great castellated 
Spanish colonial urbs in 1571.
11
 The practical reason for fortification was the threat from local 
tribes, Chinese pirates, Muslim raiders, and Spain’s European rivals (the Dutch, British, and the 
Portuguese). But this fortification soon turned into a symbolic system as well. In the 1580s, the 
Jesuit priest Antonio Sedeña designed a 2.75-mile stonewall surrounded by inner and outer 
moats that encased Spanish military, educational, hospital, and commercial institutions. The 
project was finished in the early 1590s, under Governor-General Perez Dasmariñas, whose four-
year rule was distinguished by huge compulsory labor projects using Filipino and Chinese labor. 
The city “within walls” (the literal meaning of the Latin “intra muros”) was accessible via eight 
gates. Outside this gated space was the realm of the indios, the native Filipinos. Inside were 
constructed many beautiful colonial buildings, based on Spanish Renaissance and Baroque and 
Mexican models. Interestingly, though, the imaginary of the walled town was not specific to the 
Spanish. The site of Manila had been earlier a fortified town of the native Tagalogs. 
The Spanish colonized Manila as a doorway to East Asia. It was safe-haven entrepôt for 
their galleon trade between Mexico and China. This global connection was jealously regulated. 
Until 1834, trade was reserved to the Spanish.
12
 Other Europeans and the Muslims were kept 
out. Hardly any indigenous Filipinos learnt Spanish, the international language of the portal 
city.
13
 Instead, religious education promoted local languages and the cultivation of local elites. 
In many ways the global port of Manila was a closed world. Manila became a city where the 
portal-threshold was also symbolically and practically a gated community. This was a place 
where the universal (catholic) city and its public significations of church-and-plaza were 
suborned to the imaginary of a castellated and garrisoned space. The garrison mentality subtlety 
over-determined the universal city.   
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Manila, of course, was not the Philippines. Nonetheless the intra muros model 
profoundly influenced the development of the archipelago as a whole – certainly of the other 
key colonial portal cities such as Vigan, Cebu City, and Zamboanga. On a very practical level, 
movement in and between islands was difficult. Notably absent in the Spanish Era was a well-
developed infrastructure of public roads and harbors—or later railways. This is significant 
because it is this kind of public infrastructure that encourages traffic on a large scale between 
inside and outside. All great public realms, however they are articulated—be they church-and-
plaza, temple-and-agora, museum-and-mall—require portal-and-network infrastructures to 
under-gird their symbolic structures.
14
 These portal-and-network infrastructures deliver the 
traffic—and the turnover—of persons, goods, and ideas that allows public space to be 
continuously filled and emptied. Because of its necessary defensive qualities, garrison or 
castellated space tends to militate against portal-and-network infrastructures, most especially 
those that are very porous and that permit a high level of crossing of domain boundaries.     
A garrison, by virtue of its function, is a closed system. A closed system is built on the 
careful regulation of what comes in and what goes out. Such a system is never entirely shut-off 
from its environment, but at the same time neither does it have a porous relationship with that 
environment. Closed systems rest on a strong distinction between the good inside and the bad 
outside. Open systems, in contrast, relativize the distinction between inside and outside. 
Spanish-era Philippine society developed around a series of institutions that strongly 
distinguished between an over-valued inside and an under-valued outside—e.g. between 
government (inside) and populace (outside). Where the church-and-plaza model relativized the 
distinctions between domains, e.g. between the domains of the mundane and the transcendent, 
the faithful and the faithless, the intra muros model presupposed that what was crucial was 
whether a person was “on the inside” in between “the walls of the domain”. The inside—the 
inscape—was the protected and valued domain, and thus the place to be.  
Living in the protected domain was equated with order—the order that overcomes the 
chaos that all societies must overcome. All societies create structures and arrangements. 
Relatively few societies, though, invest heavily in public structures and arrangements. Creating 
order through public forms, rather than private hierarchies, is the exception, not the rule in 
social-historical experience. Thus, despite the implantation of the church-and-plaza model in the 
Philippines, it is not so surprising that closed system order in the end largely displaced open 
system order. Variations on the intra muros model became widespread through the Philippine 
archipelago. This was based on a social-symbolic understanding that the world was divided into 
domains with strong boundaries and that careful gate keeping was needed so as to regulate the 
relation between domain and environment in favor of the protected domain rather than open 
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environment. This contrasts with the church-and-plaza model where the apse and square—or the 
portico and square—function as inter-mediation between domains. In the latter case, persons are 
constantly crossing from one domain to another through the portal spaces of public spheres. In 
this model, gateways operate to facilitate orderly traffic between domain and environment. 
Portal or public space typically functions as a “third term” between two or more private (e.g. 
household or institutional) spaces and their respective domains. In contrast, when “being inside 
the walls of the domain” is the key social value, then “being outside in the public” is aberrant 
behavior. Under these conditions, the clear distinction between the “third realm” of the public 
and the “primary” and “secondary” private domains evaporates. Simply put, everything 
becomes private because the public transit space between domains is eviscerated.  
The very perception of order changes under these conditions. “Being inside” is valued 
because the inside is a place or space that is not chaotic. It is the place of calm and order. The 
world outside of domain boundaries is chaotic. Crossing the road between domains is hazardous 
or unpleasant. Domains are not constantly translated into environments and back into domains 
through interstitial traffic. The overall effect of this is uncanny. Whether on the outside, 
“beyond the walls”, or on the inside “between the walls of the domain”, there is no clear 
distinction between public and private made. From the standpoint of church-and-plaza 
perceptions of space, expectations of what exactly is private and what exactly is public are 
continually confounded. This might not have been an issue in the Philippines had not the 
church-and-plaza model been implanted there and had it not raised social-symbolic expectations 
of traffic between domains. Spanish colonization was self-contradictory. It embedded a notion 
of publics, portals, and traffic, and then it systematically undermined this.   
The chief culprit undoubtedly was the fact that Spanish colonization was originally 
organized around the encomienda. This was a patrimonial system. Large estates were given to 
private settlers on a temporary basis by the Spanish crown. Along with land the settlers received 
the right to collect taxes. Public and private roles were indistinguishable. The state devolved, in 
a feudal-like manner, into hierarchically nested “private public” or “public private” entities. 
What matters in this world is not that someone is performing a public or a private role, but 
rather that they are inside or outside the social-system “walls”. The encomienda system was 
dismantled at the end of the seventeenth century. The system of provincial rule (alcaldías 
mayores) that replaced it, though, blurred the distinction between public and private just as 
much. Public offices were for sale. They were regarded as a source of private income for the 
office-holder. Underscoring the uncanny relation of public and private, many public functions in 
the Spanish colonial era were carried out by priests. These included responsibilities for 
examination, certification, census taking, statistics collection, and censorship. The Pauline 
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distinction between “what is God’s and what is Caesar’s”—fundamental to the differentiation of 
public and private—was blithely ignored because the Spanish state couldn’t manage to fill its 
offices with persons with the required competencies. Giving permissions—required by the 
state’s bureaucratic law—in return for bribes was the omnivorous preoccupation of public 
officers.  
One might have expected that the opponents of the Spanish might have overturned the 
intra muros social-symbolic system. But, if anything, they amplified it and reinforced it. 
Nationalist opposition to the Spanish Empire is a reminder that in politics enemies often have a 
great deal in common. Philippine nationalists simply turned the intra muros model against the 
colonial power. They portrayed Spain as the bad outside power and the antithesis of the good 
inside power of the Philippine nation. The nation, as the good inside, was defined both in 
cultural and economic terms. Political good was equated with authentic local culture and a 
closed commercial state. In so many ironic ways, this mimicked the language policies of the 
sixteenth-century Church orders and the old mercantilist trade policies of the Spanish Crown.  
 
The American Period: Success and Failure 
The attempt to create a nationalist state during the uprising against Spain in 1899 was 
stymied by the Americans. For close to forty years, the United States administered the 
Philippines under various guises. The fact that the United States replaced Spain as an 
administering power was of considerable historical significance. This is almost the only time in 
history that America established a formal colonial territory on any sizeable scale. In 
conventional developmental terms, the Americans as the colonizing power did “all the right 
things”.15 They built an extensive road, rail and harbor network—creating the basis for an 
infrastructural public. They put in place a good public education system. They made an 
international language (English) the medium of trade, government, and education. They 
carefully prepared the ground for democratic self-government.
16
 They encouraged free speech. 
They opened up American markets to Philippine goods. They created a provincial government 
(Moro Province) for the Philippine Muslim minority.
17
 In specific cases, they had spectacular 
successes. They drove up the literacy rate from 5% in 1898 to 65% in 1935. Yet, in the most 
global sense, American rule was a failure. It failed because it could not reverse the long-term 
decline of the Philippine economy relative to the wealthiest countries in the world economy.  
Comparative world data for the early nineteenth century is sketchy, and to some extent 
informed guess work, but nonetheless revealing. In 1820, the Philippines ranked the 18
th
 
wealthiest nation in the world (measured in terms of gross domestic product per capita).
18
 This 
is a position held today by the United Kingdom.
19
 In 1820, on a per capita basis the Philippines 
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was wealthier than Russia or Eastern Europe. It exceeded the average wealth of Latin America, 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. As our statistical knowledge gets surer, the story gets worse. 
By 1870, the Philippines had fallen behind Russia and Eastern Europe, as well as behind Latin 
American success stories like Argentina and Uruguay. The Middle East had nearly caught up to 
it.
20
 By 1950, the Philippines was ranked 79
th
 in the world. Some of this is accounted for by new 
states being added to world’s roster. But, however we qualify it, the bottom line was that the 
Philippine state was now exceeded by the average wealth of Latin America, East Europe, and 
the Middle East.
21
 By 1973, it had fallen to 100
th
 in the world, and by 2003, it was 106
th
 in the 
world.
22
 It began the new millennium with a gross domestic product per capita that was 40% of 
the world’s average, only in advance of averages for Asia and Africa.  
However the figures are sliced and diced, and whatever we regard as the starting-point 
for reliable figures, the trajectory of Philippine wealth creation moved downwards without relief 
for over a century and a half. And whatever definition we might afford the polity and economy 
of the archipelago across the centuries, Manila is a prime player and mover in this story. In 
1820, the wealth of the country was 105% of the world’s average. By 1870, Philippine per 
capita wealth had fallen to 88% of the world’s average. In 1913, it was 69%. In 1950, it was 
50%. In 1973, it was 48%; and in 1984, 46%.
23
 As is apparent from the figures, the long-term 
decline began in the latter part of the Spanish Era. Did free trade cause the decline? After all, 
Spanish mercantilism was abandoned in 1834 for free trade under pressure from Britain, the 
United States and other powers. From that time, the Philippines entered on a path of relative 
decline. In stark contrast, the new wealthy economies—Japan and the United States—that 
emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were protectionist. America was heavily 
protected till the 1950s, and contemporary Japan still is. Prima facie this suggests that the intra 
muros model should have been persisted with in preference to an open system of trade. But 
appearances can be deceiving.  
Indeed, for the first half of the twentieth century, “free trade” meant preferential access 
to American markets for Philippine goods. This was a bilateral (in effect a mercantilist) 
arrangement that eliminated duties on American goods exported to the Philippines and 
reciprocally on most Philippine goods going to the United States.
24
 The Philippines was not an 
American state, but, as a quasi-colony, it angled to be treated as such in trade matters. As it was, 
neither liberal “free trade” nor mercantilist “preferential trade” made any noticeable difference 
to the long-term decline of the Philippine economy. The United States and Japan illustrate why 
this was so. Both were cases of successful modernity. Both were states of permanent innovation. 
Trade policy was not the key to this in either case. America till the 1950s limited access to its 
markets, then it liberalized its trade barriers. Yet, even when it was a protectionist state, it still 
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had very porous borders, allowing the easy entry of people and ideas. The Japanese model is 
different again. Japan has always limited entry of both goods and people. Yet it has voraciously 
imported ideas. Indeed the Japanese did so long before Commodore Perry’s arrival on their 
shores in the 1850s.
25
  
In contrast, the Philippines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries lacked the key 
drivers of successful modernity. It did not aggressively import people (skills) or ideas 
(knowledge). Exclusion of aliens and distrust of foreign capital was a regular theme of 
Philippine nationalism.
26
 The historic Constitutional Convention of 1935 conceived a principle 
whereby the rights and privileges of “natural born” citizens were superior to naturalized 
citizens. It also recommended, as a matter of principle, limiting the employment of alien labor.
27
 
Education nationalism mirrored this in the realm of the arts and sciences.
28
 The 1935 
Constitution actually provided additional hours in schools to teach nationalism. The ambition of 
education nationalism was to raise ethnological study above the ideas of foreign pedagogues. It 
promoted folklore, indigenous literature, and national historiography. While American pop 
culture circulated widely in the Philippines, informal barriers to the entry of other arts and 
sciences prevailed in condescension to nationalist agendas. This was very costly.  
 American rule had little long-term effect on this. Thus, while science, technology and 
the applied arts became the driving force of Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Seoul’s spectacular 
modernity after World War Two, Manila exported its qualified and skilled labor. Nor did it 
“compensate” for this export by reciprocally importing skilled and qualified workers or 
harnessing the propulsive energies of settler cohorts. The one saving grace of the “brain drain” 
of educated or skilled Filipinos abroad was that the monies repatriated by “overseas contract 
workers” became one of the leading sectors of the local economy.29 This type of diaspora 
economy, though, was never replicated in Manila or in other Philippine cities. There is nothing 
in post-war Manila that equates the mercurial wave of overseas Chinese settlers in Hong Kong 
or Taipei, or their conjugation with Indians and Malays in Singapore. The Philippines didn’t 
even have notorious stories like the forced settlement of millions of Koreans in Japan—mainly 
in Japan’s port cities—and their mass repatriation to South Korea after the Second World War. 
Settler cities and city-regions—even ones that are the product of vile state policies—have a 
remarkable record in creating successful economies and societies. They do this because they are 
effective at proliferating traffic between domains and creating the kinds of public space and 
infrastructure that sustains such traffic. The corollary of this is that they become highly 
proficient at importing and exporting people, ideas, and/or goods.   
The Philippines as an archipelago is by definition a porous geography. Filipinos 
constitute the largest cohort of merchant mariners in the world. Manila is built around a bay. Yet 
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twentieth-century Manila did not become a magnet for overseas settlers. Instead it was subjected 
to an un-regulated flood of rural laboring poor from the countryside. The consequences of this 
internal migration from countryside to city were disastrous. It produced the opposite of what the 
settler society model produced. The cumulative result was the downward spiral of economic un-
development. One of the conditions of successful modernity is the stranger city.
30
 One of the 
reasons why Manila, despite its propitious marine location on the edge of a major sea region, 
never developed in the twentieth century as a stranger city is that the Americans came as 
administrators, not as settlers—and, unlike the British in Hong Kong and Singapore, they did 
not encourage an influx of foreigners.
31
 Political prudence in part dictated that the Americans 
not encourage settler cities around the Philippine littoral. Large numbers of aliens would have 
offended deeply entrenched Filipino nationalist sentiment. Chinese and Japanese had a history 
of settlement in the Philippines, but also a history of being resented. Nationalist politics was a 
glass for magnifying such feelings. This was not the only consideration for the Americans, 
though. America was in many respects a paradigmatic “open society”. Yet it also had its own 
strain of the intra muros mind set. Settlement abroad was not the American style. The irony is 
that the United States, as the settler society par excellence, had little taste for the re-export of its 
own people. American popular culture stimulated a post-nationalist taste amongst Filipinos for 
migration abroad. The twentieth-century Philippine diaspora became very large. But few 
Americans, the religious apart, came to live in the Philippines.
32
 As in all of its short-lived 
occupations of foreign states, the United States moved quickly to hand over most administrative 
functions to locals as soon as possible.
33
 
At stake here is not the nature of the Philippines but rather the nature of America. The 
borders of America are very porous. It imports people, ideas, and (since the mid-twentieth 
century) goods freely. But, unlike the British, it has shown little inclination to export people as 
settlers. This is unsurprising when upwards of thirty percent of the American population has 
always been isolationalist. Isolationalists see American responsibilities as being properly 
confined to the North American continent. The manifest destiny of the United States thus has 
always been a rather lonely one. Correspondingly, the projection of American power abroad has 
always been heavily reliant on its military bases. America has rarely been a colonizing power in 
the traditional sense. It has typically avoided responsibility for administering large overseas 
territories. In the exceptional cases when it has, it has done so for time-limited periods. The 
Philippines was one of those exceptions, and even that exception proved in its own way typical.  
The corollary of this was that the American presence in the Philippines was mediated 
through the more or less closed system of the American military bases and diplomatic 
compounds. This meant that, unlike the experiences of the settler societies and settler city-states, 
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American rule triggered no autopoietic civic movement, and thus no self-generating urban 
development. Indeed, the point of intersection between the military domain and the broader 
Philippine society was invariably the sleazy public of bars and brothels—hardly the best 
experience of the stranger city and its publics. This is ironic several times over. Firstly, because 
what a visit to the former U.S. naval base at Subic Bay (today a specially-administered free 
trade zone) reveals, inside its boundaries, is a model piece of mid-twentieth century American 
urbanism transplanted to the tropics. The base possesses all of the conventional urban form so 
often lacking in Manila. This is doubly ironic because the bits of Manila that do have a strong 
“Cartesian” urban morphology are more or less fortified cities. An unintended consequence of  
American occupation is the form of the perpetuation of the stockade city rather than the creation 
of a public civitas. (As we demonstrate below, Fort Bonifacio is the latest example of this 
legacy). This is triply ironic when we consider that American occupation of the Philippines 
coincided with the peak of a great spurt of American civics and the often very successful City 
Beautiful movement.
34
 The failure of the Americans in the Philippines was the failure to find a 
way to translate this bravura experience across the Pacific and into the mainstream of Philippine 
urbanism. The American civic explosion was propelled by waves of immigrants flooding into 
the United States in the latter-part of the nineteenth century. This was the era when New York, 
Chicago and San Francisco took on a mature form. Daniel Burnham’s 1905 Plan for Manila 
demonstrates that the Americans at least imagined Manila as city like Washington or Chicago.
35
 
It could have been as great an urban creation as, say, Sydney or Melbourne in the twentieth-
century inter-war era. The Burnham Plan was still the focus for urban renewal in Manila in the 
early 1990s. This is evident in the “clean up” of the Ermita and Malate areas, and the 
redevelopment of the Roxas Boulevard with a promenade.
36
 Burnham’s design of Luneta Park 
provided a major point for religious and political meetings.
37
 The Plan successfully integrated 
the Pasig River and Manila Bay waterfronts. It provided a unity between the important civic 
buildings of the era—the Post Office, City Hall, museum, and government buildings. Indeed, at 
the end of twentieth century, Burnham’s Manila was still the only part of the city that 
“breathed”, providing that crucial urban portal-public sense of “in and out”.38 It was the only 
part of the city friendly to walkers.
39
 For all of this, Burnham’s Plan suggested only what might 
be. It did not represent what was. Its rationality remained frozen in anticipation, until it became 
a memory without ever having been a reality. The real triumph of the Americans in the 
Philippines was not in urban morphology, but in public policy. In particular, the Americans 
radically transformed the field of public health.
40
 They aggressively promoted a culture of 
hygiene. This policy and practice was the product of the Progressive-era Protestant American 
ethos—a White Anglo Saxon Protestant ethos—of a “clean” society, “clean” city, and a “clean” 
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politics. It was inspired by turn-of-the-twentieth century American Progressive urban 
reformism—a curious tradition created by an anti-big-city rural Protestant middle class intent on 
“cleaning up” the new, spectacular, often corrupt, dense, impersonal, sky-scraping cities like 
New York that were utterly unlike anything previously seen in urban history.
41
 This new 
urbanism attracted millions from Catholic and Orthodox Europe.  
If you doubt that “clean” is a civic ideal, take a look at the work of Lewis Mumford. 
Mumford was a literary child of the Progressive Age and America’s great historian of the city. 
In his many books, he returned time and again to the theme of public hygiene.
42
 Just like the 
American colonial administrators in the Philippines, Mumford viewed hygenics as one of the 
chief criteria of a successful civics. In the case of the Philippines this model should not be 
sniffed at. Despite its low per capita income, the country has had tremendous success in 
preventive public health. It experienced very low rates of HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and other 
turn-of-the-twenty-first-century pandemic agents.
43
 When African societies in contrast were 
devastated by HIV/AIDS, this was no mean achievement.  
If the Philippines learnt from the Americans the ways of a “clean” society, the efforts to 
implant a “clean” city or a “clean” politics were markedly less successful. The civic hygiene 
model emphasized the idea of the garden city. Gardens represented clean air and beneficent 
sunshine. This had little traction on an urban scale in booming Manila. The population-swell of 
Metro Manila in the second half of the twentieth century left the city with few green spaces or 
parks. Notably also, professional middle class efforts to stamp out the “dirt” of corrupt politics, 
the legacy of centuries of patrimonial culture, had virtually no effect at all. Contrast this with the 
Sino-Fabianism of Singapore, where legally enforced clean habits and a very efficient water-
and-sewage socialism went hand-in-hand with carefully husbanded green areas and very strict 
regulation of corrupt behaviors.
44
 Most importantly of all, the Singaporeans also created a public 
sphere that they placed high store on. This is often misunderstood, because commentators 
habitually think of a public sphere as the place of peer-style coffeehouse debates and institutions 
of criticism. These have been late arriving in Singapore. But the city-state nonetheless was very 
successful at creating an infrastructural public. 
In contrast the Americans acquiesced in traditional Iberian-Filipino patrimonial social 
structures. This killed the Burnham Plan. To be successful, a city plan has to be congruent with 
social behaviors. Burnham’s Plan laid a civic model over a patrimonial society. In practical 
terms this left the real estate and the social economy of Manila in the hands of powerful landed 
families. The families simply ignored government planning laws, or became their own law. In 
the course of the twentieth century, these families and their successors developed an urban 
system that was reminiscent of the encomienda system.  
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The “New Encomienda” System 
In the 1920s and 1930s groups like the Legarda, Araneta, and Tuason families, who 
transformed their familial estates into rental and market properties, represented the “new 
encomienda” system. The social weight of this new urban landlordism had a peculiar distorting 
effect. It allowed the proprietor kin to become de facto city planners as well as developers and 
landlords. As far as the families were concerned, there was no real distinction between these 
roles. Anyone familiar with late Roman history will appreciate that this is also the story of the 
origins of feudalism. The estate developers in Manila created what is in effect an urban 
feudalism. Because they controlled so much land, they could ignore or circumvent American-
type civic planning regulations that required a proper, proportionate quantity of public space to 
be developed alongside residential and commercial space. They eventually built their own 
“manorial” cities within Metro Manila. 
What was at work here was not simply the effects of money and power. Just as crucial 
was the effect of the social imagination. To illustrate this, consider the case of Chicago in the 
nineteenth century. There, powerful plutocrats played an enormous role in turning Chicago into 
a world city. But the plutocrats did it by funding large civic projects and creating and 
landscaping large areas of attractive public space. The contrast is telling. Chicago’s plutocracy 
was civic-minded.
45
 It was civic-minded because the social imagination of Chicago was civic-
minded. This civic-minded character prevailed because, from its start, Chicago was a stranger 
city. It was a settler city devoted to the constant traffic of goods and people, and later on 
cultures and ideas. Chicago’s plutocracy grasped that public space was simply a step-up from 
the wharves and docks and loading bays with which it had made its fortunes. In contrast, the 
twentieth-century Manila model stressed estate-power—power over land—rather than 
circulatory power. And the estate-power was and is in the hands of particular families. Estate-
power is patrimonial power. This is why our recovering of the term ‘encomienda’ is not merely 
theatrical or analogous.  
The “new encomienda” system took off in the 1950s with the decision of the Ayala 
Family Corporation to develop Makati—the best known and the wealthiest city in Metro 
Manila.
46
 It is where financial institutions and embassies are concentrated. Instructively, Makati 
drew its name from Don Jose de Roxa’s San Pedro de Makati hacienda. The Ayala family 
turned city building into a family enterprise. They built city infrastructure, high-rise office 
buildings, retail properties, and gated communities for upper-class residents. The Ortigas 
Company repeated this in the 1980s when it turned its estate, which ran alongside the EDSA 
Avenue, into a second Central Business District for Manila—the modestly named Ortigas.47 A 
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consortium of overseas Chinese went to the next stage of “private public” neo feudal 
development in the 1990s when it acquired the lands of the former US military base at Fort 
Bonifacio, and began to turn it into a “global city”.48 The explicit aim was to fuse global high 
technology and infrastructure standards with an appropriately fortified city mentality.  
In each of these cases, the distinction between state and estate is blurred. The estate 
takes on many of the functions of a state or at the very least of a municipality. It “privatizes” 
state functions—though it is a moot point whether appellations like  “private” or “public” have 
any real meaning in the Philippine context. Family companies carry out what in other 
circumstances would be state or municipal planning decisions.
49
 They defend this as being more 
rational than the alternative—often pictured in terms of the impossibly corrupt Caesar-ism of 
the Marcos dictatorship. These years (1965-1983) produced a type of crony capitalism and 
feudal privateering that resulted in a legion of unfinished developments that combined 
grandiloquently delusional aspirations to a showpiece public order with a shoddiness of 
execution that only the truly venal can manage.
50
 Imelda Marcos was the chief purveyor of this 
folly. Her “Palace in the Sky” (at Tagatay) is a prime example of this Ozymandian 
architecture.
51
 Even when projects were completed, as in the case of her Cultural Center of the 
Philippines, the combination of Peter-the-Great like ruthlessness in its construction with a 
romantic ideology of national cultural originality produced a monument to the lonely hubris of 
the dictator-family. Built on reclaimed land on Manila Bay, and stuck out on the bay out of 
reach of the populace, the CCP presents an empty spectacle. The Leandro Locsin-designed 
building makes the obligatory nod to indigenous form, but its prime signification is that of a 
compound building. It is defensible stockade space—a cantilevered monolith. It is perfect for a 
showpiece public culture that in fact has no public.  
Nation should not be confused with public. The typical patrimonial cultural strategy is 
to collect things.
52
 The Marcos pair conceived an open door national repository for the work of 
“national artists” and the performances of “national companies”—in tacit opposition to the 
private collections of well-to-do Manila families. This cultural one-upmanship, however, was 
not the triumph of the public over the private. Rather national collecting was simply the more 
acceptable face of the legendary patrimonial-turned-kleptocratic acquisitiveness of the regime. 
The Marcos pair transformed the private not into the public but into piracy, and ordinary 
corruption into grand larceny. Measured against this, the patrimony of family capitalism—estate 
capitalism—is quite rational. It “simply” internalizes public externalities.  
Modern estate feudalism is one kind of counter to out-of-control kleptocracy. The 
developments that are typical of this new kind of urban feudalism are based on compound-type 
space. But the compound in this case includes the city rather than, as in the Ozymandian Marcos 
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model, shying away from it. The new urban feudalism threads together the closed semantics of a 
military compound with the simulation of urban activities. The American fort-turned-base city 
is a model of this kind of space—though the original model for this in fact goes back to Spanish 
fortified city and the urban semantics of the “intra muros”. The Fort Bonifacio development 
happened because the United States handed back one of a number of military bases to the 
Philippines. As a result, the first open space in Manila in the twentieth century became available 
for public redevelopment. That this proceeded in the form of a joint “public-private” venture 
indicates yet again the ambiguities of the notion of the public in Philippine life. It also 
underscores the reliance of the state on patrimonial families to drive high-technology urbanism.  
The resulting city of Fort Bonifacio unconsciously mimics the semantics of the 
encampment space that it was named for. The estate-cum-stockade city model punctuates the 
larger metropolitan city with a series of quasi-private compounds with strongly policed 
boundaries—some visible and some invisible. Like all of these kinds of corporate cities within 
Metro Manila, the spaces of Fort Bonifacio are securely bounded—in the manner of a gated 
community—against the teeming city outside. Even when the “walls” erected are invisible, they 
are walls nonetheless. They exist lest the carefully constructed order of private city is made 
chaotic. The paradox is that its planners know what is expected of a civic development. Fort 
Bonifacio proudly promotes public art, public events and public order, and builds a careful civic 
order out of efficient infrastructure (not least, the infrastructure of streetscapes). Yet it still can’t 
mesh these convincingly with each level of everyday life. Its public space is curiously empty. 
Elsewhere in unregulated Manila, streets teeming with life exclude lucent order; the order of the 
high-tech feudal-fort-gated city however excludes streets filled with life. 
The “new encomienda” system has some features that are analogous with a “company 
town”. It is proprietary system, but not in the sense of a public corporation. Its capital is familial 
or patrician. Family-patrician capital instinctively creates service classes and private security 
forces. Combined with landlord domination of urban real estate and “manorial” style planning 
power, this leads to a modern feudalism. It does not have serfs “tied to the soil”—nonetheless 
the poor clients of this system live and work in conditions where the procedural law of the state 
has little effect. The new feudalism mixes market rentals and market labor with patron-client 
service relationships and kin preference, “manorial” separation from a weak and corrupt state, 
production and service based on labor rather than skills and knowledge, and private armed 
force.  
A parallel can be drawn with the railway baron George Pullman and his creation of a 
model company town—the also modestly named Pullman—in South Chicago in the nineteenth 
century. An important difference, though, is that Pullman’s megalomaniac town was the 
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exception, not the rule, in the Chicago city-region—and, in practice, it was atypical of American 
urbanism and indeed of American capitalism. Company towns typically appeared in America 
where the local economy still had a residual patrician character—from New England textile mill 
towns to Kentucky coal mining towns.
53
 One study of these towns in the 1920s reported that 
they suffered some of the things that contemporary Manila suffers from. “The company 
townscape exhibited a uniform appearance. The absence of visual interest was the rule, a result 
from repeated building designs. The lack of trees and other landscaping did not mitigate that 
sterile appearance of rows of identical houses. Much of the infrastructure available in 
contemporary urban settings was missing: paved roads, water mains, sewer systems, and lights 
were generally non-existent.”54   
In the family-corporate city, the public sphere is turned into a private domain. In 
Manila’s case, up-scale gated residences provide their own services, like rubbish collection, and 
of course the ubiquitous security guards-cum-gate keepers. Development companies maintain 
the gated commercial properties. The rest of the space, outside of the gated domains, languishes 
in a state of neglect. The urban poor colonize it. They impose on this space their own subaltern 
logic of turning public space into private residences and compounds. Their illegal erections are 
a kind of parody of the private family corporations. Government is a captive of both the private 
poor and private rich. The rich installed in their gated domains evade taxes, leaving government 
with no money for civic infrastructure. The poor in their “undocumented” encampments give 
government a crucial resource—votes, many of them bought. Votes are the coin of official 
legitimacy. The price of that legitimacy is that the poor be allowed to continue to live in public 
space (near railway tracks, under bridges, on river embankments, and so on). The poor provide 
the cheap labor to build the next round of “manorial” cities and enclaves. The poor then 
maintain, serve and secure these stockade cities, both their own DIY squatter cities and those of 
the rich. The paradox of insecurity for the rich is that they employ the very same minions who 
they most fear  to protect them.  
 
Urban Morphology: Searching for the Platonic City 
It might be argued that Manila’s problems stem from its domination by private interests. 
But this is a world in which “the private” is a trump card. It is a trump card because of the high 
valuation of the “inside”. Between the private development of the rich and the private 
development of the poor, there is little or no public realm left over. Because Manila is not a city 
of strangers who imagine and construct the public as the commons, the public is what is leftover 
after territory and space is appropriated and occupied. As the rapid population growth of the 
metropolis continues unrestrained there is little left over.   
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It is interesting how “the outside” constantly figures as the bête noire in interpretations 
of the fate of Manila. Nationalists blame the urban blight of Manila on American bombing at the 
end of the Second World War. Without question, American bombing of the Japanese caused a 
holocaust of the city. Yet, while wartime bombing may have leveled Manila, the real cause of 
its continuing lop-sided development was the failure to construct out of the ashes a city with a 
public sphere and public infrastructure and order. After all, many of the great city renaissances 
in history—London and Chicago are cases in point—occurred after holocausts had laid them to 
waste.  
The Americans contributed $620 million in reconstruction aid after the war. But this 
triggered no concentrated mobilization of capital for civic renaissance. There was nothing like 
the drive of merchant capitalists who went to their New York and Boston bankers to finance the 
rebuilding of Chicago after the Great Fire in 1871.
55
 There was nothing like the concentrated 
effort of parliament, crown and merchant capital in Wren’s London to rebuild the city after the 
Great Fire in 1666.  Manila’s holocaust meant simply that “the plan of the city”, the “model” of 
the collective demiurge, fell into abeyance. Neo-patrimonial behaviors filled the vacuum thus 
created. There were traces left of Spanish “Baroque” and American “City Beautiful” urbanism 
beneath the clutter of Manila streets, but their form was constantly swamped by an 
overwhelming humanity that surged in from the countryside.  And the public transport system 
was not reconstructed.  
We clearly see the failures in nationalist projects like Quezon City, which was loosely 
modeled after the Baroque planning of the “city beautiful” urbanism together with elements of 
Modernism.
56
 Like a lot of misconceived Baroque or Modern urban plans, its monumentality is 
false, and its public space is unattractive. It is “big”—it has big parks, a big roundabout, and a 
big national research university. To successfully do “big” on an urban scale requires thick, 
dense public textures. Quezon City planners did “big” as empty space, much of which the urban 
poor has inevitably colonized. Its failure was the lack of civic imagination—in particular the 
lack of understanding that big civics requires the complement of medium-scale and small-scale 
civics. Such space needs to scale. Quezon City did not scale. Scalability is a Platonic value.
57
 It 
is a universal value. Nationalist urbanism instinctively rejected universalism. It treated the 
geometries of big, medium and small as a handmaiden to its romantic ideals. Such ideals, so 
often, turn into a wasteland.
58
  
Much closer in spirit to the Platonic city, and yet curiously several steps removed from 
it, is Singapore. It has no romantic wastelands at all. It is prosperous, functional, decent, and 
efficient. Yet it suffers from an oddly un-Platonic condition: soul-less-ness. This can be over-
stated, especially when many Western romantics prefer the pornography of the wasteland to 
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decent living conditions. Yet, given the large Singaporean diaspora that quietly chooses to live 
abroad, it can hardly be said that the charge of soul-less-ness is completely off-target either. 
Even the energetic Singaporean guardian-officials admit that, after a half century of 
development in a utilitarian mode, Singapore found itself lacking a “creative dimension”.59 Its 
hygienic rationalism and its high-quality infrastructure provision on its own terms could not 
reverse this deficit. So the guardians of the city-state began to talk openly of their desire to turn 
Singapore into a “renaissance city”.60  
Think of Singapore’s limits in these terms: there is no chaos on Singapore’s streets. 
Chaos is planned out of the Sino-Fabian city. But imagination is also cramped. The problem of 
Singapore is not the absence of chaos but the confusion of administration and order, and more 
particularly the confusion of rules and beauty. A society can do what Singapore has done—it 
can imitate a stock standard civic order by applying rules. Singapore’s planners very effectively 
deduced the rules of an International Style skyscraper city and applied them flawlessly in a 
tropical setting. The achievement was considerable. Yet rules do not make for beauty, but for 
clinical precision. Generating social prosperity through rules has a built-in ceiling.  
Here, though, we need to be careful not to fall into the trap of post-modern stereotyping. 
The argument being advanced is not that rules create a disciplined order that is stifling, while 
“chaosmos” is the condition of inventiveness. Chaos is certainly not inventive. The cost of 
chaos is evident when we look at the case of Manila contrasted with Singapore. Singapore has 
successfully created a public order. The order is stiff and contrived, not to say at times punitive. 
But this achievement should not be underestimated either. Genuine public culture of any kind is 
historically rare. Most human activity—from the household to the state—is private, even where 
it is official. The historical act of differentiating between public and private is very difficult, and 
most societies blur the distinction in practice.  
Manila is a prime example of a city in which the meanings of public and private have 
been rendered systematically ambiguous. This systemic ambiguity lends public and private life 
an uncanny edge. It is impossible to escape the sense that “something is not quite right” when 
all space becomes uncanny and has a pervading sense of being “close-to-chaos”. It is not 
literally chaotic. No society or city can endure actual chaos for very long, and survive intact. 
Rather this space is “close-to-chaos” in the sense that its incipient public order always seems on 
the edge of dissolve. While this may sound attractive when described on paper, in everyday life 
it is most unattractive. There is no doubt a public domain that is “close-to-chaos” can produce 
energy—as in the “teeming life” tag that is invariably applied by visitors to old Asia-Pacific 
cities. But, because it has no container, this energy is also wearying for the denizens of “close-
to-chaos” cities. The uncanny condition turns life into a vain struggle to secure what good order 
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produces: lucidity, clarity, and the satisfactions of pattern rationality. During the postmodern 
period, Western social science made a mistake in dismissing the virtue of lucidity as the work of 
an overzealous gardener who obsessively trims the social bush. But no inhabitant of Manila 
would ever tell you that the hours spent needlessly in traffic jams or searching for un-signposted 
streets is a good thing. The product of an ad-hoc city topology, in turn the tainted fruit of an ad 
hoc new feudalism, these inconveniences are wasteful of the energy they create. Chaos is the 
privilege of the over-endowed. For everyone else, well-structured public space is essential.  
This is especially so in low-income societies and developing economies. This is 
desperately so in the world’s most fragmented, privatized and un-public of cities—Manila. 
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Notes      
                                                 
1
  Metro Manila, a composite of 17 cities and municipalities, is one of the largest urban areas in the 
world. According to one estimate it is the 15
th
 largest, with a populace of 14 million. Ahead of it are the 
following: Kolkata-Howrah (14.9 million), Cairo (15.2 million), Tehran-Karaj (15.3 million), Moscow 
(15.35 million), Jakarta (16.4 million), Los Angeles (16.4 million), Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto (16.57 million), 
Delhi (18.1 million), Mumbai (18.8 million), New York (27.7 million), Seoul-Incheon (22 million), 
Mexico City (22.1 million), Sao Paulo (22.7 million), Tokyo (33.7 million).  
See Nation Master, “Largest Cities of the World Statistics”. Accessed 22 November 2011: 
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Largest-cities-of-the-world 
2
  Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. 
3
  The best illustration of the over-inflated reputation of “education” in the scheme of things comes 
from the experiences of those great minds Newton and Nietzsche. Imagine European science or arts 
without their contribution? Now both of them in their whole teaching careers had a bare handful of 
students—and probably none of these students understood what they said. It is not clear at all that 
“education” in the modern sense of the word can produce the kind of middle class essential for great 
periods of cultural and commercial flowering.  
4 
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